My understanding is that's how a lot of small aircraft crashes happen. "Well, the weather's worse than I'd like to fly in... but if we wait until tomorrow we'll miss our reservations (or whatever) and everything will be delayed... eh, it's probably fine, let's go ahead, doesn't seem that bad."
"Plan continuation bias", or as the (powered) aviation community colloquially refers to it, "get-there-itis". It's definitely a common factor in commercial aviation incidents too (though more often 'should we land here or divert' than 'should we take off').
I've never been hang gliding, but I get the sense from the article there there's another factor at play here that may be less applicable to powered pilots that should have a good understanding of the risks from their required training and pre-flight planning. An important element in the essay seems to be that hang glider pilots don't have a good understanding of the risks - due to the way crashes are perceived in the community - and that is a prerequisite for doing a competent risk analysis and formulating a safe plan in the first place. They're blind to the risks they're taking, and consider the sport safe, even when they are frequently crashing.
The teaching point of the essay to me, is more that if something can be 'safely' accomplished 99% of the time, but 1% of the time it is deadly, it is extremely unsafe, but due to confirmation bias from 'always' being successful, won't be seen as risky, and in those situations we humans need to be very deliberate about our decision making.
Community perception is an interesting point, and it reminds me of a book, Black Box Thinking [1], which I wouldn't outright recommend, but it does an interesting job of comparing safety culture across aviation and medicine.
> it is imperative that we create the systems and the culture ... to help educators learn from errors rather than feel stigmatized by them
Aviation has a very strong culture of publishing and scrutinising near misses and mistakes, and that culture leading to positive feedback loops that improve safety.
Medicine (historically, and the book's argument) chalks up mistakes to "one of those things".
Applying this to hang gliding, I managed to find quite a few careful analysis examples of accidents on forums. Obviously less scrutinised than aviation, but probably fair to say generally has a culture of safety consciousness, but in the context of an inherently deadly sport. Fair to say aviation, medicine and hang gliding all are varyingly deadly.
