> If the redaction is a person's name

I'm not sure if you're aware, but peoples names are variable in length. We are talking about a system that can identify single character differences. So that does reduce the search space, especially since names are not all possible letter permutations. Combine that with the fact that it isn't uncommon to see partial first letters show up. You can even see some instances in the Epstein files.

Of course, you can also take this further. Even if you can't recover names you can get meta information about how many parties are involved by recognizing different length redactions correspond to different entities. While same length redaction doesn't guarantee same entity it is a hint.

It is also common for authors to misspell names (proper nouns) in an attempt to determine who leaks docs (and to force non-matches for FOIA requests).

Random side fact but this was also a thing map makers did back in the day. Including fake towns. In that way they could identify who was stealing their work.

If you want to fingerprint text you can also do it by small insignificant changes to text which doesn't change the meaning.

If you have a number such locations with alternatives then you can make a number of identifiable versions by combining alternates.